Price bubbles remain a puzzle for economic theory, particularly given their appearance in experimental markets with high efficiency and minimized uncertainty and noise. We propose that bubbles are caused by the institutionalization of social norms, when individuals observe and adopt the behavior of others. Explanations of bounded rationality or individual bias appear insufficient as we show experimentally that (1) participants' pricing skills are better ex-ante than ex-post and (2) that individual discrepancies between intrinsic values and market prices become increasingly serially correlated during trading. We also find no support for the "Greater Fool" explanation. (94 words) 
real-world markets, where uncertainty and noise can lead to diverging rational expectations, but also in highly predictable experimental markets (e.g. Vernon L. Smith, Gerry L. Suchanek and Arlington W. Williams, 1988) . In a typical laboratory study, participants engage in double-auction trading of assets that are defined to have a finite lifespan and a known distribution of dividends.
Uncertainty is eliminated and participants should be able to calculate the intrinsic value of the assets simply by examining the expected stream of dividends. Nevertheless, bubbles have been observed repeatedly in experimental markets, even with sophisticated participants such as business students, managers, and professional traders. Experimental bubbles have proven robust to a variety of conditions, including short-selling, margin buying, equal portfolio endowment, brokerage fees, the presence of informed insiders, dividend certainty, constant value, and limit price change rule (Ronald R. King et al., 1993; David P. Porter and Vernon L. Smith, 2003) .
A. Bounded rationality. While a complete explanation of experimental bubbles is still in the making, research findings seem to imply that the phenomena may be the result of bounded rationality, as evident in the "behavioral versus rational" debate (e.g. Colin F. Camerer, 1989;  Peter M. Garber, 1990; Eugene N. White, 1990; Thomas Lux, 1995) . It has been shown that bubbles abated when participants traded repeatedly within the same group (Ronald R. King et al., 1993; Mark V. van Boening, Arlington W. Williams and Shawn LaMaster, 1993) . This finding can lead one to hypothesize that bounded rationality gives rise to bubbles in the short term as people may have cognitive difficulty in applying a theoretical pricing model in practice (Herbert A. Simon, 1955; Richard Cyert and James March, 1963) . Arguably, initial mispricing may be decreasing due to individual learning processes, which leads to improved pricing in subsequent periods and an overall abatement of bubbles. If bubbles are indeed caused by bounded rationality and alleviated by individual learning, then we should see indications that participants improve their asset pricing skills as they trade. For instance, we would expect that average asset prices will be farther from intrinsic values ex ante and move closer to intrinsic values ex post. We would also expect that average price deviation from intrinsic value to be higher ex ante and that price amplitude will be higher ex ante.
B. Greater Fool explanation.
A second possible explanation is that while market participants may be able to price correctly even initially, they tend to assume, wrongly, that they can buy overpriced assets and sell them at even more inflated prices to others. Not commonly addressed in the academic literature but prevalent among practitioners, the "Greater Fool" explanation posits that bubbles are fueled by speculators who knowingly purchase overpriced assets while hoping that they can sell those assets even more dearly to gullible investors, i.e. "greater fools" (e.g. David Dreman, 1993; The Economist, 2003) .
For such a belief to have a cumulative effect on markets, a sufficiently large part of market participant must be overconfident about their pricing acumen, believing that it is better than others'. Then, market participants will readily acquire overpriced assets, even if each individual participant realizes that the assets are overpriced. Nevertheless, each individual participant wrongly believes that enough others do not realize that those assets are overpriced and expects that the others will be willing to buy them at a premium.
It is reasonable to expect the overconfidence necessary for the Greater Fool explanation.
A bias known as self-serving belief leads people assess themselves to be above average in various positive characteristics (Ola Svenson, 1981; Linda Babcock and George Loewenstein, 1997) .
People were shown to be generous in self-assessment versus the population average when asked about their driving skills, managerial acumen, ethics, productivity, and other desirable characteristics. Hence, if bubbles develop because participants subscribe collectively to a selfserving belief, then we would expect to find that on average, each participant perceives her own financial acumen to be superior to that of the others.
C. Institutionalization.
It is also possible that bubbles stem not from individual biases, but from the institutionalization of social norms. Economists argued that individuals observe each other and base their decisions, at least partly, on imitation of others rather than on their own cognition (Andrei Shleifer and Lawrence H. Summers, 1990 (Joel Podolny, 2005) .
Institutionalization of social norms can lead to coordinated action through the internalization of beliefs and interpretations of facts by each individual, even without formal agreement or explicit discussion of coordination (e.g., folkways). While institutions can be formal, such as the legal system, scholars have identified that institutions can also emerge to provide order endogenously: "Behavior becomes stable and patterned, or alternatively institutionalized, not because it is imposed, but because it is elicited" (Robert H. Bates et al., 1998:8) . Such processes have been shown to sustain practices across individuals and over time, even when the practices were irrational. In an early laboratory experiment, Zucker (1977) demonstrated how institutionalization facilitated the transmission of a practice that would have clearly appeared counter-factual to an outside observer but not to the agents involved. Recently, it has been shown that people learn to coordinate their price expectations without direct communication and even when such coordination leads to erroneous outcomes (Cars Hommes et al., 2005) . Outside the laboratory, it was shown that US stock markets have systematically responded favorably to (costless) announcements of stock buyback, although it was publicly known that a significant proportion of the announcing firms did not act on their announcements 
I. Method
We constructed an experimental double auction market (Vernon L. Smith, 1962) , which is known to possess extremely competitive characteristics (Charles A. Holt, 1995) . In such markets, each participant is endowed with experimental cash and assets, and he is free to post bid and ask prices to buy and sell assets at will. The experimental market was programmed and conducted in z-Tree (Urs Fischbacher, Forthcoming), based on the seminal design of Smith, Suchanek and Williams (1988) . To maintain consistency with prior work, we replicated a recently published design (Martin Dufwenberg, Tobias Lindqvist and Evan Moore, 2005).
We recruited 62 undergraduate students with no prior experience in such experiments for ten experimental sessions in what was described to them as a "study of economic decision making". Upon arrival to the experimental laboratory, participants received an instruction sheet (Appendix 1a), which described the experiment and provided sufficient information for calculation of intrinsic values. The participants then received a Price Questionnaire that probed their knowledge of a standard asset-pricing model by asking, for instance, "In the fourth period, someone wants to sell you his stock. Write the maximum price you will be willing to pay for it".
The price questionnaire included 10 questions, one for each trading session, in random order (Appendix 1b). The participants were told that they may consult the instruction sheet to answer the questions, and were given 10 minutes to complete the questionnaire. All of them finished within the time allocated.
After the Price Questionnaires were collected, the participants were asked to complete an Assessment Questionnaire, which included questions designed to assess overconfidence. Each participant was asked to provide 1) an assessment of the accuracy of his or her own responses, 2)
an assessment of the accuracy of the other participants' responses, and 3) an assessment of the other participants' assessment of his or her own responses (Appendix 1c). This was followed by a brief demographics questionnaire (Appendix 1d).
After completing the pre-trade questionnaires, the participants moved to a behavioral laboratory, where they sat in separate cubicles in front of networked personal computers. Each participant was randomly assigned to receive either two shares and 600 cents or six shares and 200 cents. They knew that their earnings would be paid to them in cash at the end of the experiment. Once trading began, the participants could enter their minimum selling prices (ask) and their maximum offers to buy (bid). Conditions resembled a highly efficient stock market: bid and ask figures as well as eventual prices were visible to all of the participants and each one could initiate a transaction by accepting a buying or selling offer. All transactions were anonymous and participants could not communicate with each other.
Each experimental session consisted of six participants who traded for 10 periods lasting 120 seconds each. 1 At the end of each period, a dividend of 20 cents per share was payable with a probability of 0.5. A summary screen appeared at the end of each period and presented individualized trading and divided results. At the conclusion of the trading periods, the participants received a $5 show-up fee and earnings in cash. Excluding the fee, earnings were $13.38 on average (s.d.=2.87; range=$5.30-$18.30).
II. Results
In general, our results were similar to those obtained in prior work, i.e., we observed bubbles in most of the experimental sessions (interestingly, we find this even though the Price and Assessment Questionnaires could have affected behavior through psychological priming effect). More significantly, we found that discrepancies between market prices and intrinsic values were correlated among participants and became even more so over time. We found no indication 1 With the exception of the first session, which had eight participants.
that bubbles were caused by lack of knowledge. Quite the contrary; participants had a better understanding of the theoretical pricing model ex ante, but -somewhat astonishingly --seem to have partly abandoned that knowledge during trading. We also find no evidence of self-serving bias.
[ Figure 1 about here]
A. Ex-ante pricing skills. A comparison of average prices declared in the Price
Questionnaire with those obtained in actual trading revealed that, surprisingly, the prices declared ex ante were better fit to intrinsic values. We used Haessel R 2 (Walter Haessel, 1978) to measure fit between the responses to the Price Questionnaire and intrinsic values and between the trading prices and intrinsic values. We find better fit ex ante in nine out of 10 sessions. [ Table 1 about here] B. Self-serving bias. We found no indication of self-serving bias. Results obtained from the Assessment Questionnaire (Table 2) suggest that participants generally viewed their own price assessment to be as precise as the others'. The same is true about their assessment of others' perception of themselves -they assumed that the others had a correct assessment of their own capabilities. Measures of Cronbach's alpha (Lee J. Cronbach, 1951) show high reliability for each group of questionnaire items.
[ Table 2 about here] C. Decomposition of price discrepancy. The average discrepancy between a given market price and the matching intrinsic value can be decomposed into two components: dispersion and common (Cars Hommes et al., 2005) . The former measures the deviation from a common pricing method while the latter measures correlation between discrepancies in the market. Formally, where t designates the trading period (1…10) and h is a counter of transactions, the average price for period t is:
The average pricing discrepancy can be decomposed as:
The first term on the right-hand side of equation (2) measures the dispersion between prices in market transactions. It is the squared distance between a price in a specific transaction and the average price for that period, averaged across transactions and periods. The less similar are prices in the market, the higher this component would be. The second term on the righthand side measures the common component. It is the squared distance between the average price in a period and the intrinsic value for that period, averaged over periods. If price discrepancies are serially uncorrelated and uncorrelated with the discrepancies of other participants, this component will be zero. The higher the common component, the higher is the similarity between the pricing discrepancies in the market.
[ Table 3 about here] Table 3 reveals that the common component plays a major role in the discrepancies between market price and intrinsic values. It accounts for most of the variance in all sessions but one. Moreover, as Figure 2 shows, the common component tends to increase during trading, showing that errors became more correlated as trading progressed.
[ Figure 2 about here]
III. Discussion
The results suggest that price bubbles are not simply the result of individual cognitive bias. We found that participants' exhibited better understanding of intrinsic value pricing ex ante than ex post. However, this understanding was apparently abandoned during trading, resulting in worse fit to the fundamental model, higher price deviation, and higher amplitude ex post.
Because we have an indication of better knowledge ex ante, individual-level bounded rationality alone cannot explain the deviations from the fundamental model. It is unlikely that time pressure is responsible for the poorer performance during the trading session, because participants spent much more time trading (20 minutes) than answering the Price Questionnaire (10 minutes).
Surveying the perception of the participants about their own pricing skills and those of the others rules out the possibility of widespread self-serving bias. Taken together with prior findings that documented bubbles even when speculation was not possible (Vivian Lei, Charles N. Noussair and Charles R. Plott, 2001), these findings suggest little validity in the Greater Fool explanation.
In contrast, a decomposition of price discrepancy shows how substantial the common component is in such discrepancies and highlights the increasing similarity in discrepancy as trading progressed. When this analysis is taken together with the evidence about better individual pricing skills ex ante and the absence of self-serving bias, it seems to indicate that bubbles originate from institutionalization of social norms about pricing.
As Douglas C. North suggested: "We form mental models to explain and interpret the environment…[which] may be continually redefined with new experiences, including contacts with others ' ideas" (emphasis added, 1994:362-63) . While prior work has acknowledged that people observe and adopt others' behavior, few have theorized or documented institutionalization in highly efficient markets, as we do here (cf. Christopher Avery and Peter Zemsky, 1998). Further, these results show that direct communication is not be necessary for institutionalization to appear; the mere posting of bid and asks can be sufficient to spread beliefs and sway markets away from intrinsic value. Hence, if institutionalization appears so rapidly and profoundly in markets designed for high efficiency, it seems reasonable to presume an even greater institutionalization in real-world markets, financial or others, with their inherent uncertainty, lower efficiency, and direct communication between market participants.
The findings reported here allow us to rule out explanations that turn on individual biases and focus on institutional processes instead. A potentially fruitful path would be to investigate how social interaction leads to the spread and formation of shared beliefs in markets, and whether small initial differences can lead to dramatically different outcomes, as was recently shown in markets for cultural products (Matthew J. Salganik, Peter Sheridan Dodds and Duncan J. Watts, 2006) .
In this experiment, you will assume the role of a stock trader. During each period of the experiment, you will be able to buy shares from the other participants or sell to them shares that you own. You also might earn dividends on shares that you own. You will decide at which prices you are willing to buy and sell, and how many shares to hold.
You will not know the identities of the other participants or how much money they earn or lose during the experiment. Similarly, they will not know who you are or how much money you earn or lose. Please do not speak with any other participants during this experiment.
The experiment will last for approximately an hour, including time for instructions and practice.
The Market
Six participants will trade in the experiment. Selected randomly at the beginning of the experiment, half will receive 6 shares and 200 cents. The other half will receive 2 shares and 600 cents.
The experiment has 10 periods. In each period, you may buy or sell shares. The shares have a lifespan of 10 periods, and your inventory of shares carries over from one trading period to the next. Each period lasts for 120 seconds.
At the end of each trading period, each share may or may not pay a dividend. The dividend will be randomly decided as 0 or 20 cents, with 50 percent chance for either outcome. That is, the chance of receiving nothing is equal to the chance of receiving 20 cents. Thus, the average dividend per period is 10 cents.
Your profits in the market will be equal to the total of the dividends that you receive on the shares in your inventory at the end of each market period plus the cash you have at the end of the experiment. Section 3 describes how to calculate your earning.
Earnings from Dividends
You can use the table to help you make decisions. There are five columns in the table. The first column, labeled Ending Period, indicates the last trading period of the market. The second column, labeled Current Period, indicates the period during which the average holding value is being calculated. The third column gives the number of holding periods from the period in the second column until the end of the market. The fourth column, labeled Average Dividend Value per Period, gives the average amount that the dividend will be in each period for each unit held in your inventory. The fifth column, labeled Average Holding Value per Unit of Inventory, gives the expected total dividend for the remainder of the experiment for each unit held in your inventory for the rest of the market. That is, for each unit you hold for the remainder of the experiment, you can expect to receive, on average, the amount listed in column 5. The amount in column 5 is calculated by multiplying the numbers in columns 3 and 4.
For example, suppose that there are 4 periods remaining. Since there is an equal chance of receiving nothing or 20 cents, the dividend is on average 10 cents per share in each period. If you hold a share for 4 periods, the total dividend paid on the share (over the 4 periods) can be expected to be 4×10 = 40. The computer will display your earnings after each period.
There will also be a show up fee of $5 to all participants Make a Request to Buy (in cents): Enter the amount that you are willing to pay for a single share. Click the button to publish the request. It will immediately appear in the Requests to Buy column and will be visible to the other participants. The request is not visible until you publish it by pressing the button.
The Trading Screen

Center
Offers to Sell Shows the available offers in descending price order, so that the lowest price is at the bottom. Transaction price column Shows all of the prices at which a share has been bought or sold in the current period.
Requests to Buy Shows the available requests in ascending order, so that the highest price is at the bottom.
Earnings Report
The earnings report appears at the end of each period. After seeing your earnings, press the "Next" button to go to the next period. The next period will begin after all of the participants press the "Next" button. 
